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A recent study has shown, using fMRI, that the mirror neuron system
does not mediate action understanding when the observed action is
novel or when it is hard to understand.James M. Kilner1
and Chris D. Frith1,2
Social interaction depends upon
the ability to infer beliefs and
intentions in the minds of others [1].
It has been suggested that humans
can infer the intentions of others
through observation of their
actions [2]. This notion that
actions are intrinsically linked to
perception was proposed by
William James, who suggested
that ‘‘every mental representation
of a movement awakens to some
degree the actual movement
which is its object’’ [3]. The
implication is that observing,
imagining, preparing or in any way
representing an action excites the
motor program used to execute
that same action [4,5]. Interest
in this idea has grown recently
following the neurophysiological
discovery of mirror neurons and,
in turn, the mirror neuron system.
Mirror neurons, first discovered
in monkey premotor area F5 and
subsequently in inferior parietal
lobule, discharge not only during
action execution but also duringaction observation [6]. This has
led many to suggest that these
neurons could be the neural
substrate for automatic action
understanding; however, the
precise role of mirror neurons in
action understanding is a matter of
much debate [7–9].
Now Brass et al. [10] have
reported in Current Biology that, in
humans, action understanding in
novel situations is not mediated
by the mirror neuron network but
rather by an inferential interpretive
system. The authors used
functional magnetic resonance
imaging (fMRI) to measure brain
activity from healthy human
subjects whilst they watched
a series of videos in which an actor
made a very unusual action:
switching on a light with their knee.
The videos differed in the ease to
which this unusual action could
be understood. In the easy to
understand videos, the actor was
clearly unable to operate the
switch with her hands as these
were fully occupied holding some
folders, whereas in the difficult
to understand action, the actorshands were free and
consequently the actor’s
decision to operate the switch
with their knee and not their
hand is hard to understand.
The authors argue that this
latter condition should activate
any system involved in action
understanding more than
the easy to understand
action.
Brass et al. [10] found that
activity in brain areas that are
considered part of the mirror
neuron system is not modulated by
the ease of action understanding.
Instead, such modulations are
seen in brain areas that have
previously been associated with
social perception and mentalizing,
namely the superior temporal
sulcus (STS), the posterior STS
and the anterior fronto-median
cortex (aFMC). This result
demonstrates that the mirror
neuron system is not sufficient
for action understanding when the
intention of the observed action
is hard to understand. This would
suggest that the mirror neuron
system does not infer the high
level intention of an observed
action, in this example, why did
the actor operate the switch with
their knee?
Actions have to be understood
at many different levels [11]: an
intention level; a goal level that
describes short-term goals
necessary to realize the intention;
Dispatch
R33a motor signal level that describes
the pattern of motor-unit (muscle)
activity which enables the action
to be executed; and the kinematic
level that describes the movement
of the action in space and time.
For an observer to understand the
intentions of an observed action,
they must be able to describe the
observed movement at either the
goal level or the intention level
having only access to a visual
representation of the kinematic
level. The results of Brass et al.
[10] suggest that the description
of the intention of an observed
action is not encoded by the
mirror neuron system. However,
the mirror neuron system could
be encoding the goal level, a level
that describes the short-term
goals necessary to realize the
intention.
In support of this idea, Hamilton
et al. [12] used an elegant repetition
suppression paradigm in an
event-related fMRI experiment to
localize the neural representation
of action goals. They demonstrated
that in humans one of the areas
of the mirror neuron system,
the intraparietal sulcus, has
a central role in representing and
interpreting the goals of observed
hand actions. This role for the
mirror neuron system in encoding
the goal, and not the intention, of
an observed action is consistent
with the results of Brass et al. [10]:
here, the goal of the action, to
operate the light switch with the
knee, was the same in every
video. If the mirror neuron
system is encoding the goal of
the action then one would not
expect a modulation of activity in
areas of the mirror neuron
system across the different
conditions. This is indeed what
Brass et al. [10] report. These two
studies by Hamilton et al. [12]
and Brass et al. [10] would
suggest that the goal of an
observed action is encoded by
the mirror neuron system
whereas the intention of that
goal is not.
The two processes of
understanding the intention and
the goal of any observed action
are not independent. In order to
be able to infer the most likely
intention of an observed action,
the observer must first infer themost likely goal of that observed
action. For example, in Brass
et al. [10] in order to address the
question ‘why is the actor
operating the light switch with their
knee?’ the observer has to first
infer that the goal of the observed
action is to operate the light switch
with their knee. Such a hierarchical
organisation is consistent with
the proposal that the process of
inferring the intentions and goals
of observed actions is best
considered within a predictive
coding framework [13,14]. Within
this framework, signals encoding
higher-level attributes of an
observed action, such as
intentions, are predicted to be
expressed as activity in higher
cortical levels whereas those
encoding lower-level attributes,
such as the goal and the
kinematics of the movement, will
be expressed in lower cortical
levels.
The essence of the predictive
coding account is that, given
a priori expectation about the
goal/intention of the person we
are observing, we can predict their
motor commands. Given their
motor commands we can predict
the kinematics on the basis of
our own action system. The
comparison of these predicted
kinematics with the observed
kinematics generates a prediction
error. This prediction error is
used to update our representation
of the person’s motor commands.
Similarly, the inferred goals are
updated by minimising the
prediction error between the
predicted and inferred motor
commands. By minimizing the
prediction error at all the levels
of a cortical hierarchy engaged
when observing actions, the most
likely cause of the action will be
inferred at all levels — intention,
goal, motor and kinematic (see
also [15,16]). This approach
provides a mechanistic account
of how responses in the visual
and motor systems are organised
and explains how the cause of an
action can be inferred from its
observation.
Social interaction depends
upon our ability to infer beliefs
and intentions in others.
Recently, much of the research
investigating how humans areable to infer the intentions of
others has focussed on the mirror
neuron system. However, the
work by Brass et al. [10] suggests
that the mirror neuron system is
not sufficient to encode the
intentions of observed actions,
and that higher cortical levels
encoding the intention of an
observed action lie outside of
the mirror neuron system.
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